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‘New
Governance’
in
European
Corporate
Law
Regulation
as
Transnational Legal Pluralism
Peer Zumbansen*

Abstract: The present transformation of European corporate governance regulation
mirrors the challenges that have been facing the EU’s continuously evolving polity,
marked by tensions between centralised integration programmes, on the one hand,
and Member State’s embedded capitalisms, path-dependencies and rent-seeking, on the
other. As longstanding concerns with remaining obstacles to more mobility for workers,
services, business entities and capital in recent years are aligned with post-Lisbon
commitments to creating the world’s leading competitive market, European corporate
governance regulation (ECGR) has become exposed to and implicated in a set of highly
dynamic regulatory experiments. In this context, ‘New Governance’ offers itself as both
a tentative label and immodest proposal for a more responsive and innovative
approach to European law making. The following article assesses the recently
emerging regulatory forms in ECGR as illustrations of far-reaching transformations in
market governance. The arguable parallels between the EU’s regulatory transformation
in response to growing legitimacy concerns and the recurring question about whose
interests a business corporation is intended to serve, provide the framework for an
exploration of current regulatory trajectories in European corporate law that can
most adequately be understood as a telling example of transnational legal pluralism.

I

European

Corporate

Governance

Regulation:

Embeddedness and Co-Evolution
The European Commission’s corporate governance agenda occupies a unique
place within the European imagination. Since the beginning, the ‘European
company law scene’ occupied regulators and policy makers inside and outside of
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Europe, and recent innovations and changes in the approaches to regulatory
governance, have given this area a set of noteworthy turns. The arrival of ‘new
governance’ in the area of European corporate governance regulation (ECGR)
brings the already charged interests and dynamics that are at stake in this area
into much sharper contours. New Governance (NG) is itself a label for a
tremendously challenging and provoking trajectory for the EU’s transnational
governance. Ever since ‘governance’ entered the scene through the Commission’s
‘White Paper on European Governance’ in 2001,1 the spectre of a fundamental
transition from government to governance has been haunting Europe,2 as well as
transnational regulatory spheres.3 The Commission’s definition of governance as ‘a
very versatile one . . . being used in connection with several contemporary social
sciences, especially economics and political science’, and as one originating ‘from
the need of economics (as regards corporate governance) and political science (as
regards State governance) for an all-embracing concept capable of conveying diverse
meanings not covered by the traditional term “government”’4 is very open-ended and
leaves one wondering whether the definition is meant to conclude or open an
inquiry into the changing nature of market regulation.5
Without intending to overly strain the Commission’s reference to corporate
governance in the cited definition, the following observations will nevertheless
point to particular complementarities between the EU’s ongoing construction
process and the unfolding European corporate governance matrix. The varied
history of European corporate law regulation is marked by the diversity of interests
and concerns invested in this area of regulation. While the legislative record was,
until recently, not altogether comprehensive,6 ECGR has in the last years become
one of the most vibrant sectors of norm-creation and regulatory interaction. As
such, ECGR has become a regulatory universe of its own, with a large portfolio
within the Commission’s internal market division and a seemingly tireless expert

community feeding into the policy and norm-making process at every turn. With
ECGR long having left the confines of the European Court of Justice, the Council
and Parliament, it has expanded into an extremely versatile, comparative and
transnational legal field. ECGR constitutes a semi-autonomous field, comprised
both of hard law and social norms, which are in a constant relation of
complementarity, fusion and irritation.7 As such, ECGR presents formidable
challenges for legal, economic, sociological or political analysis. From the point of
view of legal pluralism, the particularity and intricacy of ECGR lies in its mixed
constitution of law and ‘social norms’.8 Seen through the legal pluralist lens,
ECGR develops as a co-evolutionary process, where the imposition of law—
which encompasses regulations, directives, recommendations and judgments—is
both shaping and being shaped by the norms evolving outside of its imposition.
Similar to the unpredictability of consequences and effects of rights/principles
transplants,9 ECGR faces enormous challenges in terms of legal certainty and
strategy,

given

its many sources of potential disturbance, irritation, and

complementing points due to its complex regulatory agenda. With a view to the
challenges facing the EU from the substantive enlargement in 2004, Silvana
Sciarra observed: ‘As the tradition of comparative legal scholarship in Europe has
taught us, the attempt to pursue a “transplant” of legal institutions uncritically is both
a sign of disregard for traditions different from the one to be transplanted, and, very
often, is an inefficient solution’.10
Adding to the difficulties arising from the multilevel and multi-stakeholder
dimension in company law regulation in Europe, ECGR has been amplifying the
tensions that underlie the conceptual and architectural distinction between
‘company’ and ‘capital market’ law, which are deeply embedded in a country’s
market regulation histories.11 Struggling with competing policy goals regarding
the enhancement of market freedoms as they relate to capital market rules, on

the one hand, and to corporate governance law, on the other, ECGR is driven to
actualise ‘the best of both worlds’. Yet, while corporate law itself appears to
continue to withstand all attempts at deconstruction and demystification by other
conceptual frameworks as to what corporations do,12 ECGR finds itself deeply
involved in a large, ever-so amorphous marketbuilding project. The ‘function’ of
the firm, as necessarily implicated within ECGR, must now extend far beyond the
financial-organisational dimensions that have recently again been depicted as the
‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ of corporate law. Within the European project, in
particular after the Lisbon Summit 200013 and its most recent reinvigoration in the
form of a ‘social makeover’,14 corporate law has become a strategic token in a
complex multilevel governance game that brings a much wider range of players to the
policy-making table than any single market regulation unit would reasonably want
to assume responsibility for.
While the to-do list for ECGR only seems to keep growing in view of
pressing competitive, social, environmental and monitoring demands,15 it has in
fact always been evolving in a particularly accentuated and contested field of
contrasting

and competing Member State agendas in pursuit of national

prosperity, of which corporate and capital market law had always been a central
building block.16 As such, ECGR has never sat comfortably within the wider
market integration agenda. The real challenges of company law harmonisation,
however, became impressively obvious during the exhausting struggle over the
adoption of a regulation concerning the creation of the European company statute,
originally initiated in the 1970s, and eventually passed after many more
compromises, in 2001.17 Another illustration of how ECGR has been inextricably
caught up in the European ‘Varieties of Capitalism’18 was, without doubt, the
long contest over a European Takeover Directive,19 which resulted in 2004 in a
directive full of loop-holes and opt-out clauses.20 Eddy Wymeersch recently called

the moment of adopting the directive a ‘provisional semifinal point in a process
that has taken more than 17 years, and according to some even more than 30
years on the way to opening up the European markets for corporate control’.21 At
the time, André Nilsen observed that ‘[T]he Takeover Directive sees light after a
long and acrimonious journey through the institutional labyrinth in Brussels’.22
As the regulatory trajectory of ECGR continues to unfold, we must be even
more sensitive to the degree to which this enterprise remains deeply embedded in
the particular dynamics of multilevel governance of European integration, on the
one hand,23 and the globalisation of markets and regulatory processes, on the
other.24 Under such conditions, an assessment of the concrete forms of normcreation presents great challenges due to ECGR’s complex appearances ranging from
‘hard’ to ‘soft’ law to norms that are developed, promulgated and disseminated by a
panoply of public and private actors.25 Therefore, instead of trying to free ECGR
from its embeddedness in this complex regulatory environment, the emphasis must
be on the exact opposite. Precisely by embracing the embeddedness of ECGR as a
transnational legal field can we begin to see better the concrete as well as the
amorphous forms of change. Embeddedness is here understood in the following four
dimensions:

a)

ECGR is informed by the policy and legislative dynamics between
corporate law and capital-market law (securities regulation) as well as
between corporate law and labour law, categorisations of functionally
separable legal areas that can be found in all advanced industrialised
societies and that are increasingly challenged through global forces of rule
making.

b)

ECGR is entangled in the European ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ with regard
to corporate and labour regulation, as evidenced, for example, in the struggle

over the Takeover Directive and the statute of the Societas Europaea.
c)

ECGR as part of the larger project towards the completion of the
European internal market,26 in particular in the post-Lisbon environment of
knowledge society politics within the EU.27

d)

ECGR as a semi-autonomous field, marked by a vibrant and yet
precarious, always threatened balance between official law making,
transnational

consultations,

recommendations,

expert

committee

preparatory

work,

communications and standardisation, that we see

unfolding on the domestic, EU supra-national and transnational level.

The following section (II) will further draw out the correlations between the ECGR
and the unfolding forms of ‘new’ and ‘experimental’ governance forms in the EU.
Section III will work out the connections between the transnational pluralism of
ECGR and emerging, parallel forms of transnational norm-creation by focusing on
the disclosure of executive compensation. The emergence of de-territorialised,
hybrid regulatory regimes, consisting of both hard and soft norms governing
particular elements of corporate governance, accentuates the degree to which ECGR
has come under pressure to facilitate quasi-neutral, ‘best’ practices in ‘good’
corporate governance. This functionalist ‘normalisation’ of corporate governance
standards illustrates, in turn, how the European company law scene28 sees itself
increasingly transnationalised. As a result, corporate governance regulation presents
formidable challenges with a view to developing adequate enabling rules for
corporate actors in highly competitive global markets, while not frustrating critics’
attempts at preventing the insulation of emerging regulatory processes from outside
assessment. The article will suggest that a combination of ‘reflexive corporate
governance’ and ‘transnational legal pluralism’ can best capture this new
regulatory challenge. With this body of law constituting an intricate combination of

both substantive and procedural aspects, evolving intertwined processes of
law/norms negotiation, dissemination and alternative ‘enforcement’ modes, ECGR
goes beyond and reaches across categories through which comparative company
law scholars have been assessing the function of the corporation29 and the rules
governing its behaviour.30 Part IV concludes.

II

‘New’ and ‘Experimentalist Governance’ in European Corporate
Law Regulation: Towards Transnational Legal Pluralism

A

ECGR between Harmonisation and Regulatory Competition

Any assessment of emerging forms of corporate governance regulation in Europe
has to build on the fast-growing body of scholarship by legal sociology and conflicts of
laws scholars,31 on the one hand, and comparative company law experts, on the
other.32 The present challenge is facilitating a mutually enriching dialogue and
exchange between this scholarship and the ongoing exploration of EU governance,
which remains—due to its complexity of levels and contexts of regulation—for
the most part a domain almost exclusively gardened by EU-focused regulatory
theorists. One important area of ‘overlap’ between EU regulatory work and
corporate governance scholarship is marked by the tension between harmonisation
and regulatory competition. This perspective has for years been informing a fruitful
comparative inquiry into the different conditions in particular between the US
federal organisation of corporate law making (states) and securities regulation
(federal).33 Recent years have seen significant progress in reaching beyond the
obvious obstacles to comparisons by focusing, on the one hand, more clearly on the
evolving flexible and hybrid forms of regulation in Europe34 and, on the other, by
sophisticating the underlying comparative methodologies.35 Again, the emphasis on
the paradoxical nature of the emerging regulatory forms as being both embedded

in learned regulatory practices from within the Member States and disembedded in
terms of evolving within a dramatically globalising market points to the
difficulties of disentangling any assessment of ECGR from the larger project of
European integration,36 which is itself inescapably and always tied to processes of
globalisation of capital, labour and rights.
It is against this background that the particular challenges facing ECGR can best
be illustrated, by studying them through the lens of transnational law and, more
specifically, through the emerging prism of transnational legal pluralism. The
connection of observations

of

the

transformation

of

public

and

private

international law towards ‘transnational law’37 and the legal-sociological and
anthropological work on legal pluralism offers important insights into a better
understanding of current trajectories of functionally determined regulatory areas.
ECGR is a powerful illustration of such a functional field, determined both by its
semi-autonomous nature with regard to its tension between law/norms and
politics/market. The latter are powerfully evident in ECGR, which emerges through
the co-evolution of the different functional dynamics, which drive corporate
organisation. At the same time, the fast-emerging forms of new corporate
organisation such as private equity vehicles and hedge funds seem to defy an
organisation-oriented assessment of the firm in favour of a differently positioned
analysis of contemporary corporate forms. As the ‘end-of-history’ thesis in
comparative corporate governance scholarship and the Berle-Means paradigm of
corporate organisation and its related governance issues are revisited and
recontextualised,38 the dramatic threat of a mortgage-loan meltdown in the spring of
2008 points to the need for a comprehensive reassessment of the corporate
governance approach for an understanding of the financial structures of the
corporate form and the contested aspiration of financial markets regulation.39

B The Polarities of EU Governance: Global Competitiveness,
Indirect Regulation and ‘Reflexive Corporate Governance’
Recent ECGR developments must be seen in the context of a highly diversified
series of norm-setting processes resulting in a veritable explosion of corporate
governance codes in Europe and elsewhere.40 With the proliferation of corporate
governance codes, influenced and pushed by international41 and transnational
activities of norm setting, discussion and thought exchange,42 it has become
increasingly difficult to identify a single institution or author of a set of norms.
Instead, the production and dissemination of corporate governance rules has, for
some time now, taken on the nature of migrating standards,43 and a crossfertilisation of norms is now regarded as eminent and necessary in shaping future
corporate activity. A distinct feature of this de-territorialised production of norms is
the radical challenge these processes pose for our understanding of what we call
law proper. With the dissemination of corporate governance codes, disclosure
standards and rules, best practices and codes of conduct, not only corporate and
securities law, but also other fields of law—such as labour and employment law—
change. The decentralisation of norm producers is repeated, mirrored and reflected
in the hybridisation of the norms themselves. It is in this sense that the study of the
proliferation of corporate governance codes and company law production in
general, and of the rules of remuneration disclosure in particular, feeds into a
broader research into the changing face of legal regulation in globally integrated
marketplaces.

What

shines

through

particular

developments

in

individual

jurisdictions in this regard is a most poignant exhibition of particular legal and
political cultures and political economies of law making and economic regulation.44
‘New’ or alternative modes of governance have been emerging in response
and reaction to the regulatory challenges that inevitably arise from these distinct

variances in ‘Member States’ regulatory design. The most remarkable regulatory
innovation in recent years is without doubt the so-called open method of coordination
(OMC), which, after emerging during the 1990s in the realm of politically contested
national, economic and employment policies, was formally adopted at the 2000
Lisbon Summit. Its defining feature has been the proceduralisation of regulatory
governance by benchmarking and disseminating non-binding objectives and
standards across a growing body of regulatory areas:45
In the years following the Lisbon Summit, the OMC . . . appeared to have become the
governance instrument of choice for EU policymaking in complex, domestically sensitive areas,
where diversity among the Member States precludes harmonisation but inaction is politically
unacceptable, and where widespread strategic uncertainty recommends mutual learning at the
national as well as the European level.46

The

departure

of the

OMC

from the

more

rigid

norm-generation

and

enforcement programme of the ‘Community method’ has been both welcomed
and criticised.47 What Francis Snyder identified as ‘the challenge of sites’ facing
the European Constitutionalist project,48 indeed constitutes the framework for the
proliferating norm-generation processes of ECGR. As we will see in the example of
regulating the disclosure requirements for executive compensation, this area of
ECGR is marked by a

deep,

underlying

tension

between

increasingly

decentralised, indirect regulatory forms, on the one hand, and vaguely defined and
yet broadly conceived policy goals against which the adequacy and the success of
lower-level norm-setting processes will be measured, on the other. At the same time,
EU internal corporate

governance negotiations

are

increasingly

becoming

disembedded from the exclusionary European context as they are complemented,
irritated and shaped by those norms and principles (‘best practices’ and
‘guidelines’ that are disseminated on the transnational level, promulgated, for
example, by actors such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD)).49
Seen, thus, under the magnifying glass, ECGR can be described as unfolding as
a particular open-ended and contestable practice.50 Even a cursory overview of
the emerging features of ECGR suggests strong corollaries between ECGR and
emerging general forms of ‘new’51 or ‘experimental’ EU governance,52 on the one
hand, and between ECGR and transnational governance forms in corporate and
labour law, on the other.53
On the ‘inside’ of the European integration process, recent years have seen a
tremendous drive towards the creation of ever-more flexible forms of indirect
regulation, benchmarking and rule/standards production through expert groups and
advisory committees. As Simon Deakin argues in this issue,54 expert groups such as the
European Corporate Governance Forum,55 while importantly building on recent
experiences with the Winter I and II groups and their vital contribution to break the
deadlock over the Takeover Directive, nevertheless reinforce and further accentuate
the drive towards a ‘right’ standard in corporate governance regulation despite the
declarations that many years of debating the convergence and divergence of
corporate governance standards56 should support the view that ‘no one size fits all’.57
Paradoxically, the operational method of the OMC, originally designed to
promote greater flexibility and pressure to foster a race to the top in social standards,
transforms itself in the context of the ECGR into an engine towards ‘best practice
in corporate governance’. The utilitarian, soft-law approach as here employed, leads
to considerably different results than would have been hoped for in other areas of
the OMC. With a view to the earlier described tensions between different
regulatory trajectories of corporate governance—consisting of an amalgamation of
company law, securities regulation, taxation and insolvency law—the pursuit of
‘best practices’ is determined by a considerably narrower scope of functional
concerns. At this point, the goals of this pursuit are fused too fast and probably

too uncritically with the functional orientation of the post-Lisbon Innovation and
Competitiveness Agenda. By emphasising the need to ensure the economic
performance and, connected herewith, the integrity and stability of financial
institutions,58 corporate governance as a regulatory field is taken out of the more
complex regulatory context we have seen unfold over the course of the
twentieth century.59
As the globalisation of corporate activity and finance undermines any attempt
at effectively re-domesticating corporate governance into the previously contained
political economies of nation states, the more appropriate conceptual approach
would be to argue for the need for a transnationalisation of corporate governance
regulation. In the case of ECGR, this would mean, first, to recognise the need for
a differentiated assessment of different nation state regulatory experiences and their
presently continuing variations and innovations.60 The next step would then not
consist in ‘translating’ specific regulatory instruments onto the transnational sphere,
but, instead, in fostering a radically functionalist understanding of corporate
governance. Such an approach would go beyond the now abundant references to ‘best
practices’, which owe their content more to the ideological battles out of which they
are emerging than to a truly functionalist governance model. Such a model would
have to be developed with the complete corporation, its markets, governance
structures, dynamics and contextual performance practices in mind. Building on
work regarding ‘reflexive law’ in the area of corporate governance and corporate
environmental responsibilities,61 a more adequate governance approach would have to
start with the corporation itself, complementing simultaneously continuing
assessments of the organisational functionalities of the corporation.62 While such
functionalist approaches to corporate governance are only now emerging,63 their
promise lies in their pursuit of governance models that are evolving directly out of
the practice, management and operation of complex business entities on uncertain

markets. While this approach would place great emphasis on self-regulation, which
would in turn create additional pressure on the regulatory systems with a mandatorylaw approach to corporate law,64 reflexive corporate governance would eventually
emerge as a more adequate and flexible approach to corporate law regulation
while—at the same time—not necessarily being insulated from ongoing assessments
of this hybrid regulatory enterprise. Instead of reacting to the long, tiresome and
frustrating harmonisation attempts in European company law with a turn to expert
rule and market governance, reflexive corporate governance would allow for a
clearer view of how political governance and corporate self-regulation can be
mutually reinforcing and optimising by constantly exposing regulatory choices and
practices to scrutiny. The prime advantage of this approach would be that the
regulatory challenges facing today’s transnational corporations could be assessed in
correlation with the ongoing transformation of the political economies in which
companies are legally constituted.65 A reflexive approach to corporate governance is
even more pressing as the dramatically unfolding debate over a present transition
from a ‘real economy’ to a ‘financial economy’66 suggests that neither a return to
embedded capitalism corporate governance regulation nor an undeterred belief in the
‘end of history of corporate law’67 with its dubious promises of triumphant
shareholder value maximisation are a viable option. This means that what would
previously have been an interest-pluralist assessment of choices in corporate
governance regulation with a view to allegedly opposed and eventually
irreconcilable

stakeholder

interests

can now

be

transposed

into

a

more

comprehensive and contextual analysis of the corporation’s functions, in particular of
its embeddedness in operational and regulatory practices.
Against this background, it is important to contextualise ECGR again within
the otherwise unfolding dynamics of hybrid governance modes within the EU.
Echoing earlier legitimacy concerns with the OMC, recent explorations of ‘new’,

‘experimentalist’ or ‘informal’68 governance critically address the instrumentalisation
of decentralised self-governance in service of a larger ‘whole’, the problem being
that both the accessibility of the implied, overall political goal along with the now
available regulatory modes are becoming ever more precarious.69 As Charles Sabel
and Jonathan Zeitlin have recently argued, the persistent legitimacy critique vis-à-vis
soft and hybrid governance forms ‘crucially overlooks the underlying architecture of
public rule making in the EU: the fundamental design for law making, and the way
this design transforms the distinct elements of EU governance by connecting them
into a novel whole’.70 The particular challenge arising from these forms of
governance is, however, the growing pressure on actors participating in multilevel norm-creation processes to identify effectively the desired output and the
coordination elements necessary for its realisation: ‘The difficulty . . . and the open
secret of administrative law in both the EU and the USA, is that it is very
often—regularly?—the case that no actor among those seeking to coordinate their
efforts has a precise enough idea of the goal either to give precise instructions to
the others or reliably recognise when their actions do or don’t serve the specified
end’.71 In defence of what they call ‘experimentalist governance’, Sabel and Zeitlin
extrapolate the legitimacy potentials of the ‘recursive redefinition of means and
ends’ at its heart by pointing out that under conditions of complex regulatory
challenges an accountability model designed for a hierarchical principal–agent
relation is no longer adequate.72 Instead of assessing whether the agent did comply
with a rule set by the principle, the agent is expected to provide ‘a good
explanation for choosing, in the light of fresh knowledge, one way of advancing
a

common,

albeit somewhat indeterminate project (as all projects are)’.

Correspondingly, ‘[p]eer review becomes in turn dynamic accountability—
accountability that anticipates the transformation of rules in use—and dynamic
accountability becomes the key to “anomalous” administrative law’.73 The authors

certainly recognise the limitations of the proposed endorsement of experimental
governance, when they address the tension between the described participatory
processes and democracy. But, their response is radical: while acknowledging the
unavailability of a large-scale democratic justification of the new system of
governance, Sabel and Zeitlin emphasise how accountability through peer review
can help destabilise ‘entrenched forms of authority—starting with, but not
limited to technical authority’.74 Importantly, they argue, the ‘diffusion of
procedural commitments to transparency and participation in EU networked
governance has had a democratising destabilisation effect in terms of stimulating
demands to widen the circle of actors and alternatives involved in policy making at
the national as well as the European level’.75
This short discussion of EU ‘experimentalist’ governance modes points to the
deeper complexity of tying an exploration of ECGR into the context of European
governance. As the following case study will illustrate, the particular challenge
arises from the intersection of national and transnational law making in an
overall hotly contested regulatory area. There has been and continues to be
considerable pressure on European corporations to become more attractive to
foreign investors, first, by both changing core corporate governance rules and,
second, by substantively expanding its disclosure portfolio. The peculiar trajectory
of the European attempt at introducing standards regarding the disclosure of
executive compensation can be used to highlight the persistent tension between
‘old’ and ‘new’ EU governance.

III

The Case of Executive Compensation

A Breaking the Deadlock: Governance by Expertise

While it has oft been repeated that there is no universally optimal system of
corporate governance and that, despite upheld claims of an ‘end of history in corporate
law’, there is much likelihood for continued divergences and persistence of distinct
regimes, the case of management compensation illustrates the changing dynamics
within the ECGR process. As hard-law harmonisation in the area of company law
seems to be out of reach,76 soft-law harmonisation might prove to be a far more
efficient approach to regulatory change in that respect. While company law experts
in the 1970s harboured highest hopes for a flourishing harmonisation programme
of company laws in Europe,77 the ensuing decades have received a much more
reserved assessment. Over time it became apparent that harmonisation could not
be achieved in many central areas of company law given the substantial, political,
socio-economic and legal differences of company law organisation in the
European Member States.78 Instead, the European Commission as the principal
initiator of European-wide company law legislation pursued various projects in the
area of capital market and securities law, which would remain, until very recently,
the only areas where Brussels could function as a law-making motor.79 Recently,
much of this well-known status quo has come into greater movement. Among
the events and developments that have contributed to a notable increase in
legislative activity in this area are the already mentioned Societas Europaea and the
Takeover Directive, the ECJ’s judgment in Centros and follow-up decisions in
2002, 2003 and 2004, and a fourth and in many ways very promising
development, which had been initiated by the Commission amidst the turmoil
surrounding the deliberations around the Takeover Directive. In 2002, the
Commission mandated the so-called High Level Group of Company Law Experts
under the chairmanship of Dutch law professor, Jaap Winter, to prepare a
comprehensive report to facilitate the directive’s adoption.80 Shortly after the
Group had submitted its report, the Commission asked for another study. This

mandate constituted the starting point for an entirely new wave of European
company law making. When the Winter Group submitted its Report of the High
Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern Regulatory Framework for
Company Law in Europe in November 2002 (the Winter 2 report), it did no less
than present an outline, blueprint and wish-list for future legislative projects for the
European company law legislator.81 Based on the Winter 2 report, the Commission
drafted a concise outline of future legislative projects, the ‘Modernising Company
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union—A Plan to
Move Forward’, the so-called Action Plan.82 Given the wide range of issues
addressed in its Action Plan, including, inter alia, corporate governance
disclosure, strengthening of shareholder rights, modernising corporate boards and
coordinating the corporate governance efforts of Member States,83 the Commission
invited

public comments

designed

to

assist

it

in

the

realisation

and

implementation of the Action Plan’s agenda.84 When, in November 2003, the
Directorate General Internal Market, the Commission’s subdivision responsible for
company law, issued a synthesis of the responses received on the Action Plan,85 it
highlighted the overwhelming public support for the attempt embodied in the Action
Plan to work towards a higher capital market efficiency and enhanced confidence
in the market.86 It further reiterated that many participants in the consultation had
stressed the necessity of a ‘fully integrated approach combining self-regulatory
market solutions, adequate co-ordination of corporate governance codes and
legislation where necessary’, while recognising that there cannot be a one-size-fitsall solution87 for corporate governance in Europe. In light of the continuing
differing company law structures in Europe and the differences in the political
economies among Member States, it has been the consensus for some years now
not to pursue a uniform corporate governance model but to enhance better
transparency, communication and learning across Member State borders.88

B Governance by Transparency
Among the more recently pursued issues, however, by the law makers in Brussels,
was a European-wide regime for executive compensation. Already highlighted in the
Winter 2 report,89 the Action Plan of May 2003 re-emphasised the need for an
initiative in this regard, which would basically be oriented around the central
principles of shareholder approval and full, ie individualised, disclosure of the
compensation schemes.90 The Commission acted in this regard by issuing, on 14
December 2004, a Recommendation:91 ‘fostering an appropriate regime for the
remuneration of directors of listed companies’.92 Under (3), the Commission
highlighted the central role of the compensation scheme’s disclosure for good
corporate governance: ‘The disclosure of accurate and timely information by the
issuers of securities builds sustained investor confidence and constitutes an important
tool for promoting sound corporate governance throughout the Community’.93 One
of the remarkable features of this Recommendation was that it addressed questions
of disclosure over any substantive issues related to directors’ remuneration. While the
Recommendation subsequently addressed ‘remuneration policy’, ‘remuneration of
individual directors’, ‘share-based remuneration’ and ‘information’, its central
focus was on issues of transparency, disclosure and effective communication of
the compensation details to shareholders and investors. The Commission addressed
this Recommendation to the Member States94 and underlined the necessity of
Member States taking ‘all appropriate measures’ to ensure that companies registered
in their jurisdictions have regard to this Recommendation.95
To understand the particular dynamics of European law making, mention should
be made of the discernible tension between Brussels’ political will to install a
Europeanwide regime, on the one hand, and its awareness of the numerous

obstacles, on the other. The Recommendation did in very explicit terms highlight
the political embeddedness of the remuneration regime within the greater system of
corporate governance. Section (2) of the Recommendation reads:
. . . remuneration is one of the key areas where executive directors may have a conflict of interest
and where due account should be taken of the interests of shareholders. Remuneration systems
should therefore be subjected to appropriate governance controls, based on adequate information
rights. In this respect, it is important to respect fully the diversity of corporate governance systems
within the Community, which reflect different Member States’ views about the roles of corporations
and of bodies responsible for the determination of policy on the remuneration of directors, and the
remuneration of individual actors.96

This section expresses—in very simple terms—one of the most compelling
features of European company law development, ie the great divergence between
different company law traditions and histories.97 While the history of ECGR has
long been marked by struggles over nationally distinct corporate governance
regimes,98 more recent accounts document the origins, causes and prospects for
change.99 As already alluded to, the regulatory changes taking place in Brussels
and in various Member States strongly reflect trends of parallel law-making
initiatives that, on the one hand, involve official norm-setting bodies such as the
Commission and the Member States’ parliaments, and, on the other, non-state
actors,

expert

commissions

and

private

enterprises,

complementing

or

accompanying the official law-making processes through an amalgam of private,
informal law-making regimes.100 The particular challenge lies in the proliferation of
sites, levels and forms of law making. As is shown next through a brief account of
the German response to the European Recommendation, norms are sometimes the
result of a highly intricate and unpredictable political process, during which the
legislative initiative moves back and forth between domestic and supranational
(Berlin—Brussels) and between unofficial and official law makers (Expert
Commission—Federal Legislator).

The Commission’s Recommendation of December 2004 soon began to trigger
reactions

in

Member

States

that—according

to

paragraph

8.1.

of

the

Recommendation— were ‘invited to take the necessary measures to promote the
application . . . by 30 June 2006’. According to the legal, non-binding nature of this
regulatory instrument, Member States were invited ‘to notify the Commission of
measures taken in accordance with the Recommendation in order to allow the
Commission to monitor closely the situation and, on this basis, to assess the need
for further measures’. Not only did the Recommendation appear to be just about
one of the most elegant, non-coercive and perhaps most permeating legal
instruments in a highly politically contested regulatory environment, but it also
might have offered just the right amount of pressure and substance to allow
Member States to pursue domestically certain policies that otherwise might have
proven too politically sensitive.
At the core of this small case-study is the ‘law’ governing the disclosure of
executive compensation in large, publicly traded business corporations. In recent
years, there has been much development in this area, mostly initiated by public
resistance against high pay packages for corporate leaders all too often now
associated with excessive rentseeking and fraudulent behaviour.101 Academic work
alone on the issue of executive compensation—while having grown with the rise
in real-world compensation during the 1990s bull market—has eventually outgrown
this development.102 Even a superficial survey of the media and the scholarly
literature suggests that the topic has not ceased to attract immense attention—from
the academy and policy advisory circles to the media and the general public. The
mood regarding the subject, however, might have—or so we hope—matured over
time. With allegedly or potentially everyone driving a BMW in parts of California
a few years ago, the perception of success in the market was that it was generally
accompanied and documented by steep increases in management pay. With

Bernard Ebbers convicted by a jury that remained utterly unimpressed by his
pleas of ignorance vis-à-vis the fraudulent events in Enron,103 today’s discussion
about executive compensation seems again to be moving in another direction.
Generally, the attitudes rank from scepticism to outright hostility with regard to the
increasingly mediatised compensation programmes.104 In the shadow of the dramatic
and existential destruction of real capital and lifelong earnings with the collapse of
the dot.com market in 2002,105 it may come as little surprise that the discussion
about management pay has again risen to the fore of public attention.106
Academic debate has played a large role in giving voice to the various
positions defended in this regard.107 William Bratton, in an insightful discussion and
critique of Bebchuk and Fried’s important book,108 recognises in this discussion
not merely an opposition between antiand pro-management arguments, but a
‘contest for shareholder

capitalism’s

high

ground’.109 This

observation

is

particularly poignant as it highlights that within the quarrel, notably not so much
over the amount of compensation paid, but over whether this amount is
adequately tied to the management’s success in creating shareholder value, there
ought still be some room to question the starting premise, namely whether one
can continue reasonably to define the firm’s objective by no more and no less than
shareholder value (SHV) maximisation.110
A recurring argument at present deliberations over excessive chief executive
officer (CEO) pay and the promises of controlling management behaviour through
the addition of stock-driven components into their salary, is the contention that the
issue of incentivising management behaviour is really more complicated than that.
Closely tied to this contention is the suggestion that the corporation is really more
complicated than SHV theory might sometimes be taken to suggest.111 As a result,
the connection made between CEO compensation packages and these CEOs’ success
in creating SHV underscores the theoretical paradigm which sees the corporation, in

rough terms, less as an entity channelling and collectivising various interests,
ranging from investors over employees and creditors to society at large, but as a
nexus of contractual relations, entered into solely with the creation of shareholder
profit in mind.112 In their description of how the model of the firm, emerging from
the substitution of smaller, closely held and founder-governed enterprises by large,
publicly traded corporations between 1880 and 1930,113 placed the investors at the
mercy of their managers, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means114 pointed out that the
real challenge of reconciling the separation of ownership and control lay in a
realistic and context-sensitive appreciation of the evolving political economy of
corporate practice and corporate regulation. Here lies the key to undoing much of
the more recent apprehension of Berle and Means as forerunners of the SHV
paradigm.115 The disembedding of Berle and Means’ work occurred at a time of
increasingly vibrant securities markets in the 1980s by reducing their argument to a
mere call to arms in favour of stronger management control in the interest
shareholders. This move paid—and continues to pay—little to no attention to the
contemporary political economy, management and ownership structure at the time of
Berle and Means’ writing.116 Berle and Means did not contend themselves with
critiquing the challenge of the threatening ‘separation of ownership and
control’. Instead, they made clear, and Berle would go to emphasise this point
much more strongly some decades later,117 that the corporation also ought to be
understood as an eminently important social and political institution.118 While Berle
and Means’ critique of an unaccountable management caste continued to dominate
corporate law thinking for decades to come, since the 1960s, economists and
corporate law authors asked why, if the separation of ownership and control thesis
was correct, investors had not been deterred from buying corporate shares. Their
response, which would prove to remain influential to our present day, was, in
short, that besides internal governance and control mechanisms such as shareholder

suits or the firing of executives, there were also alternative, outside control
mechanisms. As advanced by Henry Manne,119 but also by others writing on
regulatory competition,120 the market for corporate control would exercise a strong
enough control mechanism to keep management within range.121 The management’s
concern with how the market assesses the value of the firm under their guidance
allegedly made it responsive to market opinion, most powerfully addressed by the
selling of shares, reduction in value and acquisition/take-over by another
corporation, which would regularly replace the incumbent management. This
emerging understanding of the separation of ownership and control/problem
prepared the ground for the rise of the nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation,
which spread, aided by the rise of the law and economics movement, like a prairie fire
through the 1970s corporate law arena.122 The nexus model shifted the focus
significantly, but much of this shift had already been announcing itself with a
growing disillusionment with government regulation all throughout the 1980s and
1990s,123 culminating eventually in the rise to power by Margaret Thatcher in the
UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA. The contractarian model, thus, fits smoothly
into a larger political climate where emphasis was placed on individual
responsibility, private ordering and the greater burden on the state to justify any
intervention. Certainly, a considerable amount of critique was and continues to be
mounted against the contractarian premises of corporate governance.124 What
matters for our discussion, however, is not the final resolution of the debate over
the nexus model of the corporation, but the recognition of this model as an
important theoretical background for any concept of non-state regulation of the
corporation. This section on the development of corporate law theory already
indicates that there can be no adequate understanding of the regulatory framework
for the corporation without an exposure to the various lines of contestation of the
firm itself.125 In fact, what makes the discussion of executive compensation so

interesting, and Bratton’s observation even more insightful, is that we can recognise
a set of much more fundamental questions that underlie the different contentions
about competences to determine compensation packages. These questions concern
our understanding and concept of the corporation as a regulatory object, subject and
space.
One particular element of the current discussion and our reason to draw from
the example of executive compensation for our argument is the particular
dynamics of regulatory politics in this area. As already indicated, we can note an
interesting shift away from the material issues of how much CEOs are being
paid, who sets the compensation packages and how justified these payments are,126
to questions regarding the regulatory framework of executive compensation.
While the extreme amounts being distributed to top management surely remain on
academics’,127 policy makers’ and the public’s mind, an intriguing discussion has
emerged which addresses this problem from another perspective. It is this
perspective on the regulatory structure of executive compensation, the related
competences128 and now, more importantly, its disclosure that ought to be moved
into the centre of attention.129 While the regulation and disclosure of CEO pay
figures as a means of controlling management, be that on a running, day-to-day
basis or in the context of corporate acquisitions,130 remains an interesting aspect of
the present discussion, an even more fruitful approach to understanding the
regulatory dynamics of executive compensation would be to focus on how the various
forms of corporate disclosure can be read as new means of regulating the company
as such.131
The latter feeds into a parallel, contemporary debate about mandatory versus
voluntary disclosure, a discussion, which emerged in the aftermath of government
regulation after the financial scandals of firms such as Enron, WorldCom and Tyco.
Here we find ourselves again in the midst of long-standing and dramatically urgent

deliberations over state versus market-based approaches to securities regulation.132
Central to this discussion over the merits or drawbacks of voluntary versus
mandatory disclosure is the fundamental recognition of disclosure and transparency
as regulatory means. As recently reiterated by Cynthia Williams, the recognition of
disclosure as a regulatory instrument, certainly, goes back a long time, at least to the
work done by Brandeis, Berle and Means.133 The present discussion focuses
predominantly on the positive effects (or, the lack thereof) of the US government’s
regulatory initiatives after Enron, most notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,134
which has subsequently come under heavy fire.135
What is to be taken from this discussion for our present inquiry into the
conditions of ECGR as transnational legal pluralism is the focus on the idea of
regulation through disclosure, which constitutes an alternative to substantial
regulatory approaches. The example of disclosure of corporate earnings allows us
to explore the intertwining of substantive standards and formal procedures, as it
plays out in this area in a most intriguing way. Whereas the substantial issue at
hand would primarily be what would be considered an adequate compensation
scheme, the secondary issue would be who— investors, directors, managers—should
be authorised to establish the amount of compensation to be allocated to a
company’s top management.136 The first issue would be the substantive question
regarding the adequacy of the compensation package, while the second issue would
go to the heart of the corporate governance problem, namely, who inside of the firm
gets to determine CEO pay packages and how can investors (and the firm) be
protected against management’s self-dealing. Apart from these substantive issues,
however, lies a formal one. The formal issue is concerned with how executive
compensation is regulated, in other words, whether the regulation of executive
compensation ought to be assumed by the government or whether it could be left to
private ordering.

A case in point for this development is the legislation introducing disclosure
obligations for German stock corporations adopted in 2005.137 This legislation is
particularly interesting when seen in light of the ongoing corporate governance
reforms in Germany, on the one hand, and the initiatives in this regard from the
Commission. While Germany is currently undergoing what is, without doubt, the
most comprehensive overhaul of company and securities law reform in decades,138
the dynamics of this process can only adequately be assessed in light of the
greater discussions about the pressure on ‘Germany Inc’ in a globally integrated
market environment where investor confidence is key to gaining access to capital
from large institutional investors.139 It is necessary to understand the particular
quality of contemporary law reform in corporate governance in order to fully
grasp the regulatory options available to the participants. As we shall see, this
regulatory field is neither purely public nor private in nature. The intricate
interaction

between

the

government,

a semi-public,

semi-private

expert

commission, and industry representatives in a farreaching public debate over
mandatory versus voluntary disclosure of CEO earnings, which we will describe in
the following, leads us to the thesis that, rather than having the possibility to decide
clearly in favour or against mandatory (or voluntary) disclosure, the outcome of
the struggle depends in reality on a complex and even unpredictable set of
developments taking place in a volatile and hybrid regulatory environment. This
means that rather than being a straightforward example of either a radically
decentralised

and

de-hierarchised

law-making

enterprise

or

a

top-down,

government-made legal regime, the particular development of law making in
Germany in this area illustrates the absence of clear-cut solutions. As has
already become clear from the preceding section concerning the contested legal
nature of corporate governance codes, the regulation of CEO compensation
disclosure in Germany turns out to be a further illustration of an intricate

intertwining of public and private ordering.
Executive compensation came onto the German corporate law reform agenda
mainly under the pressure of an international, globe-spanning discussion over
excessive CEO

pay

packages,

management

self-dealing,

underscoring

the

investor’s ultimate powerlessness to constrain effectively fraudulent and otherwise
illicit behaviour among managers. As such, executive compensation is yet another
example of an issue that emerges in a particular regulatory, political and cultural
context, but attains allegedly universal contours when entering a common debate
among academics and policy makers around the world. As has become clear in
the ongoing discussion over the convergence and divergence of different
corporate governance models, many issues (such as outside directors and auditors,
takeovers or regulatory competition), which had once been remembered in the
concrete context in which they originated,140 have come to occupy our minds as
unavoidable challenges for law makers and regulatory theory worldwide.141 In
order, however, to understand how a corporate governance idea, principle or
theory enters into an existing regulatory framework and paradigm, we need to shed
light on this paradigm in its greater embeddedness, rather than treating it simply as an
autonomous, isolated tabula rasa, just waiting to be filled with strange words.142
The notion of embeddedness, however, is certainly anything but easy to
concretise. Against the background of contemporary revivals and reassessments of
Karl Polanyi’s seminal work on the ‘evolution of the “market pattern”’,143 what has
been triggering the recently reawakened interest in Polanyi is the still unsatisfactory
analysis and realisation of the concept of embeddedness. It is thus no surprise that
economic sociologists144 and corporate law scholars with a distinct interest in the
embedding factor of ‘culture’145 emphasise the need of taking a closer look at the
way in which the notion of embeddedness can help assess the contemporary
dynamics between formal and informal rule making. Above all, this research, itself

developing against the background of a longstanding interest in ‘social norms’,146
points to the distinct challenges arising in the area of comparative legal research
where the analytical lens is not wide enough to capture the complex structure of
such

‘semi-autonomous’

fields,

as

they

are

emerging

along functionally

differentiated, organisational and regulatory areas.
The ‘shocks’ that have been hitting German147 and European148 corporate
governance and that by many accounts demand a no less than radical reform of
existing laws,149 appear in a different light when perceived from a regulatory
perspective. In this regard, executive compensation becomes an example of how
top-down law-making approaches alternate, interact and intertwine with attempts to
promote corporate self-regulation, non-official norm setting and alternative lawenforcement mechanisms. These choices between alternative regulatory instruments
and the concrete evolution of public, private and hybrid public–private ordering are
deeply embedded in a nation’s political economy and regulatory environment.150 No
assessment of their legal nature, their compatibility with an existing institutional and
normative regulatory environment,

up

to

questions

of

compliance

and

enforceability can be carried out without reference to a specific context. It should
already have become clear that in emerging areas of transnational law making,
these contexts can increasingly be deterritorialised.151 But, in many cases, our
interest remains fixated on the emergence of new legal regimes out of existing
normative infrastructures. Just as much specific consumer protection instruments
might be influenced by acquired views on how a specific consumer protection
philosophy should be developed and promoted within a specific political
economy,152 other emerging normative regimes show the same degree of
embeddedness. Corporate governance codes, given their complex and in many ways
still not entirely resolved legal nature, will have to be interpreted with at least a view
to the particular legal and regulatory environment in which they were conceptualised

and developed: ‘Corporate governance codes function within a given legal
environment. The interaction with the legal system is a complex matter that differs
considerably from state to state, both due to differences in the legal status of the
codes, but also due to differences in the environing legal system’.153
Research by sociologists, lawyers, cultural psychologists and economic historians
on evolution, path dependency and embeddedness suggests that the relationships
between regulatory instruments and causal outcomes cannot adequately be captured
by the use of dichotomies. Often-employed dichotomies include the state and the
market,154 markets and hierarchies,155 public and private156 or the firm and its
environment: ‘Such

dichotomies construct divisions between two opposing,

mutually exclusive categories. Dichotomy formulations always involve a binary
choice, which limits the ability to measure complexity’.157 These findings not only
coincide with the critique put forward by legal sociologists and legal theorists
against the use of dichotomies such as market versus state, or public versus private
when assessing new regulatory structures in a transforming welfare state,158 but
also contribute to and greatly enrich the work done by Varieties of Capitalism
scholars referred to above.159 The lessons learned so far from work done in
employment,160 corporate161 and social welfare law162 teach us about the
embeddedness of regulatory regimes in historically grown cultural, political and
economic institutions. As we expand the traditional Varieties of Capitalism lens to
study the evolving nature of the identified liberal and coordinated market
regimes,163 in particular the shifting weights between political sides164 and the
intricate and unpredictable interaction between public and private actors,165 we can
begin to grasp the challenge put before us through the cited examples of regulatory
change. We are thus slowly beginning to reach beyond the historical origins of
particular institutions, their alleged starting points and ensuing trajectories, lockins and aberrations166 to look more closely at the particular dynamics of

regulatory change occurring both with regard to the institutions and the
normative content that can be found to govern a particular field.

C The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Reform in Germany
a) Governing ‘Germany Inc’
For the longest time, the governing norm for executive compensation in German
stock corporations has been section 8(1) of the Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation
Act). It reads:
In setting up the total earnings for each member of the Management Board (Salary, Profit
participation, Compensation, Insurances, Provisions and auxiliary remunerations of any type), the
Supervisory Board must ensure that the total earnings remain appropriate in relation to the tasks of
the Manager and the state of the company. This correspondingly is true also of retirement pay,
payments to heirs and related payments.167

The norm’s most prominent and governing features are both its explicitness
and implicitness. The law demands that the remuneration of members of a stock
corporation’s executive or managing board must be appropriate (angemessen) to the
tasks of the board member and to the situation of the company (Lage der
Gesellschaft). That is its explicitness. The implicitness of the norm can be seen in its
silence as regards further specification and substantiation of this appropriateness.
While

much

discussion

has taken

place

with

regard

to

the

level

of

appropriateness in executive pay, this has comparatively been less than elsewhere.
Largely responsible for the comparative acquiescence of the wider public in what
German managers earn might be attributed to a simultaneous awareness that the
German Vorstandssprecher

and Vorstandsmitglieder (CEOs

and

managers)

generally earn strikingly less than their peers in New York or Los Angeles.168
While in Germany, as in elsewhere, financial scandals in recent years have led

to public concern about excessive management pay,169 law-making activity in the last
two years has remarkably focused less on substance than on procedure, in particular
on the rules governing disclosure of management earnings. German stock
corporations

are

obliged under section 285(9) of the Handelsgesetzbuch

(Commercial Code) to identify in their annual report the collective sum of
compensation earned by the collectivity, be it the board of managers or the
supervisory council. While this obligation extends to different categories of
remuneration—salary, bonuses and options—it used to stop short of demanding
disclosure of individual earnings of board members.
In the meantime, following the installation of the Corporate Governance
Code Commission under the chairmanship of Gerhard Cromme in 2001,170 which
had presented a Code in February 2002, some advance was made towards pushing
German industry to disclose individualised corporate earnings. In the aftermath,
however, policy makers, industry leaders and lobbyists disagreed about the need to
comply with the Code’s recommendations.171 A legislative proposal introduced by
the Ministry of Justice in March 2005 changed this state of ambivalence.172
According to the new provisions, which came into force on 1 January 2006,
companies are obliged to disclose detailed management earnings.173 This constituted
a

dramatic

change

to

the

prior

regime under section 285(9) of the

Handelsgesetzbuch. Yet, the real degree to which the new legislation departs from
the old state of the law can only be discerned when appreciated against the
background of the political and regulatory climate that prevailed before and after
the introduction of the new law. For this, we must again look to the proliferation of
corporate governance codes generally and to the German example as a telling
illustration: What became strikingly clear was that the introduction of selfintroductory instruments in the area of company law did and continues to constitute
a challenge to traditional understandings of legislative authority among German

scholars. While there seems to be a wide-ranging consensus on the need to
improve investor confidence, at the centre of which we find calls for greater
corporate transparency, better accountability and a more effective corporate
governance, much of which is endorsed in the recommendations and suggestions of
the German Corporate Governance Code, the concerns about its still not fully
resolved constitutional status, on the one hand, and questions of voluntary
compliance, on the other, continue to be problematic. The story of the Corporate
Earnings Disclosure Law of 2005 is a most telling illustration of this ambiguity.
To cite again the Justice Minister in her speech of November 2004 relating to the
draft legislation: ‘The Principle of societal selfregulation lies at the roots of the
success

of

corporate

governance.

Rightfully

this principle

has

received

international support and many followers’.174 She went on to highlight the reasons
why her government should at this time not pursue the adoption of a public act
instead of continuing to find further voluntary support for the Corporate Governance
Code’s recommendation to disclose individual earnings, declaring that she thinks
that:
also in this area norms included in the Code are better than rigid statutory laws. Because especially in
this sensible field voluntary changes of heart and self-regulation are more advantageous than state
coercion. That is why we prefer—against many other voices—the economy’s self-regulation
through a flexible recommendation of the Code. From our point of view, therefore there is no need to
pass a statutory law regulating the disclosure of corporate earnings.175

The mood, however, changed within a matter of months. In fact, already in
summer 2004, the Minister had underscored her commitment to industry selfregulation, emphasising simultaneously, however, that she would pursue a
legislative solution by mid-2005, if industry bosses proved resilient towards the
Code’s recommendations.176 Much of this drive for this change of mind,
however, turned out to come from a place where only few would have expected

it. None other than the chairman of the first Corporate Governance Commission
of 2001, which had prepared not only the most comprehensive task list for the
company law legislator in the post-War era, but also had called in its final report
for the installation of a second commission mandated to draft the Corporate
Governance Code.177 Professor Theodor Baums had become the leading voice for a
statutory regulation of corporate earnings disclosure. In many weeks of lobbying in
early 2005, Professor Baums scathed German industry leaders to comply with the
recommendations of the Code to disclose their earnings in an individualised form:
Concerning an obligation to disclose corporate earnings, the Code postulates this already today.
Unfortunately, however, there is a consensus among approximately two-thirds of all DAX
corporations not to follow these recommendations of the Code. In our view, this constitutes a
veritable abuse of that instrument. And it is for this reason that the Federal Justice Minister is
rightfully threatening with a statutory obligation. The EU Commission holds a similar view.178

b) The Hybridisation of Law Making: The Return of the State?
Read in light of the euphoric declarations regarding the value of a newly
discovered ability of the German economy to modernise itself through the means of
selfregulation,179 and the fragility of the embeddedness of corporate and industry
selfregulation is in the larger regulatory culture. To speak, like Professor Baums did
in the cited interview, of an ‘abuse’ of the Code by companies mutually agreeing
not to provide an individualised disclosure of their management compensation
schemes, surely turns the idea of self-regulation on its head. This is even more
remarkable as Professor Baums himself highlighted the innovative and reform
potential of selfregulation, which he studied with his commission between 2000
and 2001, before submitting his final report to the German Government in July
2001.180 Likewise, the Justice Minister highlighted the success of corporate selfregulation through Corporate Governance Codes, referring specifically to the recently
revised Corporate Governance Principles drafted by the OECD.181

The regulatory origin and scope of the recent German legislation is of
particular interest in that it underlines the above-suggested hybridisation of the
norms governing this field. While the Ministry makes it very clear that it deems
earnings disclosure of management to be of vital importance for rebuilding and
strengthening international investor confidence in German firms, the draft foresees
the possibility for the shareholder assembly to vote against disclosure with a threequarters majority.182 Certainly, while this has met with criticism, this option
powerfully underscores the political dilemma the legislator is facing in this area.
Given the stern and outspoken resistance of influential industry leaders in the past
months against an obligation to disclose management earnings, the option clause
seems a well-reasoned compromise. But, with regard to the perspective taken here on
the changing shape of reforming a fast-evolving and highly sensitive area such as
company law, the larger questions lie elsewhere. The remuneration dispute is but the
tip of the iceberg of the long-standing struggle over adequate ways of valuating the
firm and, with it, a richer assessment of what is at stake in the current SHV debate.
Clearly, Ferrarini, Moloney and Vespro are right in their assertion that ‘It is easier
to find problems than solutions in this field’.183

IV
A

Conclusion
very

important

element

in

the

making

of

border-crossing

corporate

governance regimes is their specific emergence through soft law, often issued and
disseminated by non-state actors such as international organisations, associations
or private corporations. While this article highlighted the particular dynamics
through which the ‘juridical touchdown’ will sometimes occur with domestic
governments initiating legislative projects to enhance, further ground or to enforce
the soft norms of corporate selfregulation, the lesson to be learned consists in
sensibilising us to the intricate interwoven character of private and public

regulation in this context. On the one

hand, many of the law-making

developments in this area could not be imagined without the push coming from nonstate actors, issuing and disseminating codes of conduct, recommendations and norms
for the global market place. On the other hand, however, the German case study
illustrated the particular, deeply embedded regulatory dynamics of norm-creation in
a much-contested area. As corporate governance scholarship continues to sharpen
its lens for deeper structures of formal/informal norm creation and the particular
socio-economic cultures184 in which different hybrid regulatory approaches emerge,
it becomes evident to what degree ‘comparative corporate governance’185 is being
transformed into a multi-disciplinary area of regulatory analysis. Our focus on the
way in which corporate governance principles are received by and simultaneously
are shaping different national political economies sharpens our perceptions for
the existing differences in countries’ corporate laws, but even more so for the specific
ways in which soft law becomes intertwined, changed, adapted and interwoven
within a regulatory environment which itself is no longer stable. To cite, once again,
the German example: the major corporate reform of 1998, the so-called
Transparency and Control Legislation,186 did begin a lengthy process of national soulsearching into the governing principles of a set of company law rules, the scope and
content of which had for some time already ceased to be a merely domestic concern,
but had instead become part of a transnational debate over ‘good corporate
governance’. While domestic politicians, scholars and lobbyists would engage in
deliberating over every detail of German corporate governance,187 the issues being
discussed, the proposals on the table and the problem awareness among the law
reformers were of a veritable transnational nature, emerging from parallel reform
efforts in other countries, among private and non-state actors around the world and
the public at large. In that sense,188 domestic company law reform can clearly be
seen as part of an emerging transnational legal pluralism. Its defining feature is

the continuing contestation of the very distinction on which legal pluralism would
be conceived to rest upon: the distinction between law and non-law. As has
become clear, corporate governance norms offer themselves as a telling example
of the transformation of traditional state-originating, official norm-setting in favour
of increasingly de-centralised, multi-level processes of norm production. At the same
time, not only are norms produced on more levels; the nature of these norms
themselves changes dramatically. What our assessment of the present trajectories
of ECGR and the case study of Germany so far have illuminated is the changing
nature of regulating business in globally interdependent markets, suggesting nothing
less than a far-reaching erosion of boundaries between state and non-state actors,
official and unofficial law, public and private ordering.189
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